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1 INTRODUCTION'
The new world order which has emerged since the
end of state socialism in East Central Europè and the
former Soviet Union has been hailed by its defenders
as a triumph for liberal democracy (Fukuyama,
1992). The frequent equation of 'liberal and demo-
cratic' with 'the market' in the former state socialist
countries is clearly inaccurate. Moreover, the liberal
and democratic credentials of the new world order
in the West and the South, particularly in interna-
tional institutions such as the G7 meetings of the
leading industrial countries, in the Bretton Woods
institutions, and in the new-found peace-keeping
role of the UN, are open to challenge. Quite apart
from the struggle of the new world order to establish
its legitimacy as 'liberal and democratic', it has at
least two other critical weak points: a tendency
towards increased social inequality, and increasing
environmental degradation (Anderson 1992: 363).
An alternative to the emerging world order involv-
ing major institutional change cannot easily be con-
structed so soon after the fall of state socialism; in
fact, some authors argue that capitalist liberal de-
mocracy is the end point of major systemic develop-
ment of society (Fukuyama 1992).
However, it certainly is possible to begin to think of
a world order which is more liberal and democratic
and which has less inequality than is currently the
case, and with less environmental damage. This
article concentrates on the dimensions of economic
inequality within the emerging new world order
and the extent to which dynamic processes of change
are likely to improve inequalities. In order to do this,
a minimal subset of issues must enter into the analy-
sis: economics, ethics and relations of domination.
Typically, economists feel more comfortable dealing
with positive and normative issues than with rela-
tions of domination or with power. A standard
dictionary definition of domination is to have com-
manding influence over, or to have commanding
power. Power in turn is defined as the ability to do
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or to act. In the economics literature, a more subtle
definition of economic power turns on the capacity
to alter incentives so that action in the interests of a
powerful individual or entity is undertaken freely
(on this see Bardhan 1991). Orthodox neoclassical
economics mainly looks at market power - the ca-
pacity to charge prices above competitive prices.
Classical Marxism defines economic power arising
from property relations: the power (or lack of) that
people enjoy over their labour power or over the
means of production (see Cohen 1986: 13). Bardhan
(1991) explores some recent extensions of these tra-
ditional formulations to the exercise of economic
power within bargaining games, economic organi-
zations and capitalist authority relations.
There is a sense in which property relations form the
basis of economic power at the micro level described
in the previous paragraph. However, property rela-
tions also form the basis of economic power at the
macro economy-wide level, or more broadly, at the
systemic level. North (1990, Ch. 6) argues from a
neoclassical perspective that political decision-mak-
ing specifies and enforces property rights and indi-
vidual contracts, whilst the political structure is also
influenced by the structure of economic interests.
This contrasts with the classical Marxian view, elo-
quently expounded and summarized by Cohen
(1986), in which the level of development of produc-
tive power (means of production and labour power,
including skills and productive knowledge) deter-
mines the nature of the economic structure (relations
of economic pówer over labour power and means of
production or property relations), and economic
structure explains the nature of the superstructure
(the legal and political relations of society).
In this article, I will draw on the concept of economic
power applied at the micro and macro level in
several of the above senses, particularly monopoly
power, and within the economic structure and its
associated economic organizations, capitalist au-
thority relations and property relations. Given the
short time span of the analysis, I make no attempt to
discriminate between the competing neoclassical
(North) and Marxian (Cohen) views on the direc-
tions of causality in determining the role of property
relations.
In Section 2 a framework for analysis of international
inequality drawing on Roemer's theory of exploita-
tion is set out Roemer (1982, 1986, 1988). In Section
3, some of the changes affecting international in-
equality and economic power in the post-war period
are described and analysed. These are examined
from the perspective of income distribution; pov-
erty; growth and convergence; natural resources;
human resources and productive knowledge; insti-
tutions; accumulation, distribution and exploita-
tion; markets; status exploitation and gender. Some
implications of the identified trends for the 1990s for
economic inequality are drawn out in Section 4.
2 EXPLOITATION AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER
Conceptually, the sources of international inequal-
ity for a given set of property relations, or with
different property relations, can be broken down
into those components arising from different en-
dowments of productive assets, from relationships
of status and privilege, from differential needs, or
from institutional differences. In the context of
Roemer's general theory of exploitation, the interna-
tional inequalities which arise in such circumstances
can be judged to be exploitative when one group or
class of agents gains at the expense of another (see
Roemer 1982, 1988 and Evans 1989).
More formally, Roemer's theory of exploitation is
based on the theory of co-operative games in which
the core of a game is specified for a distribution of
income for which no agent in an economy is ex-
ploited. The situation in which no agent is exploited
is referred to as a hypothetically feasible alternative
to the initial situation, or a counterfactual situation.
A coalition of agents is said to be exploited if, under
appropriately defined rules of withdrawal to the
counterfactual, their initial position is worse than
that which can be obtained under the hypothetically
feasible alternative situation. The game-theoretical
definition is designed to capture exploitation when
arms-length transactions are present. Nevertheless,
it is also required that the exploiting coalition be in a
position of dominance over the exploited coalition to
rule out some perverse cases, for example when an
'exploiting' coalition is a group of socially sup-
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ported children or invalids (see Roemer 1986),
p104). Dominance also enters the picture at the point
when consideration is given to the ways in which a
particular set of property relations are maintained
by an exploiting class, and when labour process and
status (gender) issues are introduced.
Roemer's theory of exploitation is useful because
particular forms of exploitation such as feudal and
capitalist exploitation are special cases of the general
theory. Thus, in the context of classical Marxism,
capitalist exploitation arises in a closed economy
when there is a labour market and unequal owner-
ship of alienable assets. The counterfactual against
which this inequality is compared is one in which
each agent receives his/her per capita share of profit
as well as their wage income. In this case, the ethical
proposition is that workers are entitled to the prod-
uct of their labour. In an open economy situation,
unequal national endowments of physical capital
are considered, and the counterfactual is a situation
in which each nation is endowed with the same stock
of capital per worker. The initial situation is referred
to as one of Unequal Exchange.
Other counterfactuals are possible, each with their
own ethical justification and feasibility. In the present
context, income distribution in the world economy,
viewed from a national rather than an individual
perspective, might be judged from the perspective of
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) called
for in the 1970s involving a reduction in the dispari-
ties between rich and poor countries and the recog-
nition of the sovereign rights of nations. From an
individual perspective within nations, distribution
might be viewed from the perspective of the theory
of justice developed by Rawls (1971), in which judge-
ments are made on the basis of the most deprived
members of society in terms of the availability of
primary goods. These include rights, liberties and
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social
basis of self-respect (on this, see Rawls 1971, Section
11 and Sen 1981). Aggregated across nations, the
position of the most deprived persons could be
looked at from a world perspective; the reduction in
national disparities as called for in the NIEO only
captures part of the problem of the improvement in
the availability of primary goods to individuals in
the world economy.
The application of a Rawlsian perspective on the
provision of primary goods to individuals does not
give a clear counterfactual against which world
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income distribution can be judged as does the Mandan
case. For present purposes, the primary focus will be
on the actual distribution of income. Roughly speak-
ing, the working assumption of this article is that the
actual distribution of income in the world economy
is far more unequal than that which would be re-
quired even by a loosely defined Rawlsian counter-
factual, and that the NIEO ideal of reduced national
disparities represents an improvement on the
Rawlsian criterion, in spite of its abstraction from
national disparities. By implication, substantial non-
marginal changes would be required in the world
economy to satisfy the Rawisian counterfactual.
In the Marxian example above, world income in-
equalities were driven by the unequal national en-
dowments of productive capital. In the real world,
there are other important determinants of income
and income inequalities which can usefully be borne
in mind when approaching the empirical determi-
nants of disparities. Some of the relevant endow-
ments or attributes of a nation will include:
Productive - reproducible capital
Power - natural resources
- labour power, including
skills and productive
knowledge
Economic relations of economic
Structure power over labour
power and means of
production (property
relations).
Markets market and non-market
and forms of domination
Institutions including monopoly
power
- subsistence or institution
ally given wage if any
institutional arrange-
ments governing
property rights and the
distribution of the fruits
of scale economies or
other externalities
Needs and - differential needs
gender - relations of status and
status dominance between
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men and women which
govern gender relations
in the household, in
markets and in asset
holding.
In a dynamic context, it is the changes in these stock
variables and attributes over time which govern the
growth of income and its distribution. In the next
section, a rough sketch of income distribution and
growth in the world economy in the post-war period
will be given with an interpretation in terms of some
of the underlying determinants of initial endow-
ments, and of changing endowments, described
above. Wherever possible, the implications for eco-
nomic power will be drawn out.
3 AN EMPIRICAL SKETCH OF THE WORLD
ECONOMY
3.1 Income dIstribution
The net effect of all of the interaction between all of
the endowment characteristics of different countries
and economic achievement is summarized in the
Appendix, Table 1, for the main regions of the world
economy and for four income groups. Table IA
shows for 1980 that, on a country basis, both Africa
and Developing Asia had about one tenth of the per
capita income of Canada and the US measured on a
purchasing power parity basis. However, since
1980, the African share of world income is on a
declining trend whilst the Asian share is sharply
increasing. Viewed from the perspective of the
lowest and highest income receivers in the world
economy shown in Table IB, around 60 per cent of
the world's population in 1980 lived in countries
with a per capita income of less than 10 per cent of the
industrialized countries. However, the share of
world income accruing to the poorest countries,
after a period of decline up to 1980, shows a marked
increase to 1988. This is due mainly to the good
growth performance of India and an excellent growth
performance of China over the 1980s. The vastly
lower productive power of the majority of people in
the world economy compared with the industrial
countries is reflected in the measured income dis-
parities, as is power as the ability to do or act which,
in economic terms, is extremely unequally distrib-
uted in the world economy. This point is underlined
when the world economy is viewed from a poverty
perspective.
3.2 Poverty
In the Developing Asian context, the greatest inci-
dence of poverty is amongst landless rural labour-
ers; in Africa it is both small peasant farmer and
urban dweller; in Latin America, poverty is prima-
rily an urban problem (Lipton 1989), (Weeks and
Jamal 1993 forthcoming). To quantify the incidence
of poverty, two indicators are shown in the Appen-
dix, Table 2. In Tables 2A and 2B, the proportion of
impoverished households and the prevalence of
underweight pre-school children in the major devel-
oping regions of the world economy are shown.
Both indicators of poverty have well-known defi-
ciencies, but a very similar picture emerges from
both tables. The poverty-line data suggest that for all
developing countries in 1985, a little over forty per-
cent of developing country households receive in-
comes at or below the estimated regional poverty
line-thresholds, whilst a little under 40 per cent of all
pre-school children are underweight. The picture
for the regional distribution of poverty is roughly
similar for both measures. Moreover, both indica-
tors show a declining incidence of poverty up to the
mid 1980s for all regions except for Africa; undoubt-
edly, disaggregation of the poverty-line estimates
for Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest would show this
region alone accounting for most of the increased
incidence of poverty in the 1980s.
The above picture on poverty is very incomplete,
with no break-down of the incidence of poverty into
differential effects on men and women. Table 2 does
not record the failure of many of the industrial
economies to deal with poverty in their midst in the
1980s, or the dramatic rise in poverty in the former
state socialist economies of eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union (see UN 1992b and Einhorn
1993 forthcoming) for a discussion of some of the
implications for poverty of economic breakdown in
East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union).
Thus, the incidence of poverty suggested by the
indicators in Table 2 is likely to be an understatement
of world poverty: there are grounds for serious
concern over the extent to which the world economy
has been able to deliver primary goods to its citizens.
There are two polar opposite routes towards im-
proving the income of the poorest - from static
redistribution or from the benefits of growth. In the
1970s, international redistribution was fashionable.
This strategy collapsed in the 1980s, namely the
attempt to emulate the OPEC strategy by improving
the terms of trade for commodities important to
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developing countries through the UNCTAD Inte-
grated Commodities Programme (IPC). The IPC
policy interventions failed (see Evans (1989, Section
5) and at the terms of trade outcome in the 1980s,
documented in UNCTAD 1992: 9, Table 3), shows
that the non-fuel prices for primary commodities
(excluding fuel), measured in terms of dollars, de-
clined modestly throughout the decade. There were
no over-all benefits for developing countries on this
account. Redistribution with growth, pressed for by
the World Bank in the 1970s as a national strategy for
developing countries, was muted by the sea change
of economic policy from public to private initiatives
which took place at the beginning of the 1980s. It was
hoped that policy reform in developing countries,
principally through price reform and rolling back
the state, would lead to increased private capital
flows and increased growth; the favourable out-
come only applied very selectively to some of the
East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)
and often not for the reasons put forward by the
Bretton Woods institutions (see Evans 1992; Wade
1990 and White (ed.) 1988). In these cases, where
growth was accompanied by a rapid expansion of
labour intensive exports, there was some redistribu-
tion of income to wage earners in the growth process
- a limited form of the original strategy of redistribu-
tion with growth which had already begun in the
1960s. For most developing countries, the debt crisis
meant that, in the aggregate, the decline in private
capital flows and increased debt servicing require-
ments overwhelmed the modest increase in Official
Development Assistance (ODA) which took place in
the 1980s (see Maddison 1989: 147, Table D-11) and
World Development Report (1992, Table 23). Redis-
tribution with growth was not to re-emerge as a
major objective from the World Bank till the end of
the 1980s (see for example World Bank 1990). If
redistributive strategies towards the world's poor
have neither been successful nor seriously attempted,
what about the prospects that growth will improve
the provision of the income component of primary
goods in the world economy?
3.3 Growth and convergence
The growth performance of the world economy by
major region since 1950 is set out in the Appendix,
Table 3, based on Maddison (1989). He characterizes
the period 1950-1973 as the Golden Age; apart from
Asia, there is a marked down-turn in the growth of
GDP per capita in the period 1973-1987 compared
with the period 1950-1973. For the Golden Age
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period, there is evidence of divergence of the growth
rates of per capita GDP for developing countries as
a whole compared with the OECD countries, but for
convergence between the industrial countries. Thus,
a statistical analysis of Maddison's data by Baumol
(1986), for the extended period 1879 to 1979, shows
a convergence of productivity per work-hour within
a group of 16 industrial countries. Baumol obtains
similar results for the industrial and for the centrally
planned economies for the period 1950-1980 based
on data for 72 countries using data taken from the
Penn World Table, a comprehensive data set for the
study of income distribution in the world economy
(see Summers and Heston 1991). However, for
developing countries, Baumol finds that there has
been divergence, a result which is replicated in
Dowrick (1992) for the period 1960-1988 based on a
sample of 113 countries from the Penn World Table
described above. Whereas poor countries are found
to have had the benefits of technological catch-up
deriving from the ability of less advanced economies
to learn from the industrial economies, this does not
necessarily lead to a capacity to close the gap in per
capita incomes. Dowrick finds that the latter capac-
ity is strongly influenced by increases in the share of
the population in the workforce and the investment
share of GDP. The poorest countries in Dowrick's
sample had a declining share of employment in total
population as well as a weak investment perform-
ance, a result which was in strong contrast to the
Asian NICs in the sample. For the latter, the catch-
up effect was hardly present, but the employment
and capital deepening effects were strong. Thus,
with the exception of the NICs, there has been
divergence in the growth performance of the devel-
oped and developing countries and an increased per
capita income gap.
3.4 Natural resources
In the fastest growing countries in the post-war
period, good initial endowments of natural resources
have been much less important than other endow-
ments. In fact, a case can be made suggesting that a
rich endowment of natural resources, particularly
mineral resources, can lower long-run growth pros-
pects when economic policy is dominated by the
short-run management problems created by booms
and busts which disrupt other sectors in the economy.
This phenomenon is sometimes called the Dutch
Disease after natural gas finds in the 1960s in the
Netherlands induced a boom which triggered
deindustrialization. Given the failure of 1970s at-
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tempts to redistribute OPEC oil revenues to the least
developed countries, it would seem that both on
redistributive and long-run growth grounds, the
presence of ample natural resources can be as much
a hindrance as a help for the removal of poverty. In
fact it might be said that the unequal distribution of
economic power which can arise from the unevei
distribution of natural resources within the world
economy, particularly mineral resources, may clash
with the ethically driven aim to improve the distri-
bution of primary goods.
3.5 Human resources and productive
knowledge
Compared with the list of endowments which are
likely to be important in influencing distributional
outcomes, Dowrick's analysis directly measures only
potential for technological catch-up and the role of
the accumulation of capital; undoubtedly, techno-
logical catch up also requires the accumulation of
human capital as well.
In Table 4A, it can be seen there is a much stronger
rate of accumulation of human capital, here meas-
ured by the average years of formal education, in the
Developing Asian sample compared with either
Latin American countries or the industrialized coun-
tries. Table 4 B shows the gross enrolment ratios at
different levels of schooling, an indicator of the
accumulation of human capital. Compared with
both the Developing Asian and Latin American
experience, the accumulation of human capital
through education is particularly weak in Africa.
This evidence is consistent with the widely-held
belief that an important part of the favourable Devel-
oping Asian experience, first Taiwan and Korea, and
later China, is built upon the good initial endow-
ments and the rapid accumulation of human capital
as well as physical capital.
Within the new world order, much weight has been
given to the role of Multinational Corporations
(MNCs) as a vehicle for the diffusion of productive
knowledge from developed to developing countries
in the industrial and service sectors. Typically,
relatively little thought has been given to the proc-
esses whereby the basic stock of skills accumulated
through the formal education system could be trans-
formed into productive knowledge. The MNC is
usually viewed as a vehicle for packaging capital,
technology and access to markets, thereby provid-
ing the organizational framework for internalizing
any externalities which might otherwise lead to
market imperfections, hindering the production of
productive knowledge, particularly in the markets
for information and technology. However, even
prior to the debt crisis, the role and the effectiveness
of the MNC in the dissemination of productive
knowledge varied greatly (Best 1990). In the 1980s,
MNC investment has been overwhelmingly concen-
trated in the industrialized countries where the stocks
of human capital and productive knowledge have
already been accumulated (Julius 1990). Moreover,
the institutional framework within which produc-
tive knowledge has been accumulated, within which
imperfections in markets for information and tech-
nology have been overcome, and within which new
flexible production methods producing high-qual-
ity and differentiated products have developed, has
varied considerably in time and space. The Japanese
variant of the MNC model is characterized by large
vertically-integrated firms around which large num-
bers of small firms cluster, with close links to state
institutions (see Best 1990: Ch. 6). The so-called
Third Italy is an example of a small-scale export-
oriented industry, where local government has
played a decisive facilitating role in the development
of services for small scale industry which are typi-
cally provided by the head office of MNCs. Signifi-
cantly for relations of domination at the point of
production, both the large-scale and small-scale ver-
sions of the new flexible production methods in-
volve both the development of more cooperative
relations between workers and between workers
and management. In principle, the new methods of
flexible production are widely applicable in devel-
oping countries, but case-study evidence of this
taking place is only just beginning to emerge (see
Kaplinsky 1993). However, just as there is institu-
tional diversity in the generation of productive knowl-
edge in the industrialized countries, so it is with
developing countries using less advanced technol-
ogy and organisational practice. For example, in the
Korean case, the large business groups or chaebol
contrast with the smaller firm experience of Taiwan,
but in both cases there was a strong involvement of
both central state and sector-specific institutions in
the development of productive knowledge. How-
ever, there is little evidence that Korea has moved
seriously into more flexible production methods as
a part of the process of improving product quality
(see Humphrey 1993). The picture of institutional
diversity in the provision of productive knowledge
is completed by considering agriculture, where pub-
lic sector institutions have played a key role in the
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development and dissemination of the new hybrid
seeds behind the Green Revolution (Lipton 1989).
The neo-liberal emphasis on price reform and arms-
length transactions, coupled with a rolling back of
the state, misses the importance of both institutional
diversity and the productive role of the state.
3.6 Institutions
It is difficult to separate out the contribution of the
institutional framework for the accumulation of pro-
ductive knowledge from other factors affecting
growth. What is clear from the most rapidly grow-
ing East Asian NICs is that the extent of state and
MNC involvement in the accumulation of produc-
tive knowledge and the extent to which flexible
production methods have been introduced in devel-
oping countries has varied greatly. No clear case can
be made for recommending replication of any par-
ticular institutional model in other parts of the devel-
oping world, or in the former state socialist econo-
mies in transition (see White 1988) and Wade (1990).
Indeed, the more general point can be made, that the
appropriate institutional arrangements and the role
of the state in governing the evolution of the labour
process, of property rights and the distribution of the
benefits of scale economies regulation of monopo-
listic or oligopolistic markets) and of externalities
remain highly controversial within the new world
order. Blind application of free-market economics
to the former state socialist economies has undoubt-
edly intensified their transitional problems with
adverse consequences for inequality and poverty.
The Chinese and Vietnamese attempts to reform
their state socialist economies towards market so-
cialism, or even state capitalism, drawing on other
East Asian experience and learning from the nega-
tive example of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, are particularly significant in this
regard (see White 1993).
An important aspect of national attributes with im-
portant social and distributional consequences is the
presence or absence of a subsistence or institution-
ally given wage. This affects developing countries
with remaining elements of subsistence wage deter-
mination or with minimum wage legislation as much
as the industrialized countries within the EC which
are in the process of enacting a social charter govern-
ing minimum rights of workers in employment. In
so far as such measures or wage determining proc-
esses tend to raise real wages in the short run, they
are likely to lower employment and the accumula-
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tion of capital in an open economy context. They
also lead to resistance to policies which lower urban
real incomes which are often required by the Bretton
Woods institutions as a part of policy conditional
stabilization and structural adjustment loans (Mosley
et al. 1991). In an ideal world, the distortionary
effects of wage determination which is partly insti-
tutionally determined could be offset by across-the-
board wage subsidies, possibly administered through
a merging of national taxation and social safety net
systems. In the case of stabilization and structural
adjustment, when the real income cuts required by
the adjustment process offend national perspectives
on acceptable moral and historical norms, greater
consideration could be given to increased sharing of
the adjustment costs by the developed countries. In
the case of the unification of Germany, very high
adjustment costs through social security and other
transfers to the former East Germany have been
made without the benefit of assistance to industrial
transformation which could have been achieved had
wage subsidies been linked with a more realistic
exchange-rate package at the time of unification. At
the national level, it would seem that the new world
order has yet to come to terms with the clash be-
tween demands for a social element in wage deter-
mination and the efficiency consequences of such
policies.
3.7 Accumulation, distribution and
exploitation
In John Roemer's terms, the rapid accumulation of
both physical and human capital by developing
countries without the hindrance of institutional real
wage determination lowers Marxian exploitation.
This occurs since workers in rapidly accumulating
countries end up with a larger share of world en-
dowments of those productive assets. It also repre-
sents an improvement in the distribution of income
on the Rawlsian criterion as well. These processes
are strikingly exemplified in East Asia, where the
rapid accumulation of physical and human capital
has taken place in the absence of institutional wage
determination. The internal distribution conse-
quences of growth in these countries have been
relatively favourable in maintaining or increasing
the returns to labour compared with capital. At the
lower end of the skill spectrum, the early expansion
of labour intensive exports rapidly increased the
demand for labour and led to rapidly increasing
wages. In so far as these countries have been able to
rapidly increase the skilled labour content of their
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
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exports, the return to skill formation has been
enhanced.
The other side of the coin of the favourable distribu-
tional consequences of the rapid accumulation of
physical and human capital in the Far East has been
decline in the demand for unskilled labour within
the industrialized countries, and increasingly a de-
cline in the demand for skilled labour. The empow-
erment of workers in the centres of accumulation has
left developed country workers relatively
disempowered. These trends have adverse distribu-
tional consequences for the industrialized countries
and underlie much of the increased developed coun-
try protectionism in the 1970s and 1980s (see Evans
1991) and Wood 1991). These adverse developed
country effects of rapid accumulation in the NICs
have tended to dominate debates on policy issues,
rather than the favourable consequences for world
income distribution which arise.
3.8 Markets
The concept of exploitation used so far applies to
arms-length competitive markets in which there is
no monopoly power. At the level of the world
economy, monopoly power is exerted in two most
obvious ways: through producer cartels such as
OPEC or the de Beers diamond cartel, and through
a wide variety of oligopolistic and monopolistically
competitive markets for goods and services. As
already discussed, the attempt to harness the first
type of monopoly power in the interests of the poor
through the UNCTAD IPC failed. Residual argu-
ments for temporary recognition of poor producer
monopoly power can be made m the context of
structural adjustment and trade policy liberalisa-
tion, for example for the producers of tropical bever-
ages who have suffered significant income loss in
recent years through the implementation of trade
policy reform required or recommended by the
Bretton Woods institutions (see Evans et al. 1992).
However, such arguments cannot be made in the
long-run context of an open competitive world
economy: in an ideal Rawlsian world, it would be
better to address the adverse distributional conse-
quences which arise from limiting the monopoly
power of poor country exporters by offsetting direct
non-distorting measures to improve their income
distribution and access to primary goods.
The case of oligopolistic and monopolistically com-
petitive markets has been studied extensively in the
new strategic trade theory (see Krugman (ed.) 1986).
Not only is the theoretical outcome of the exertion of
monopoly power highly sensitive to the model's
assumptions and parameters, but the empirical case-
study material is as yet under-developed. However,
there is a sense in which the new strategic trade
theory has become very important in the world
economy. The central idea is that, when scale econo-
mies are present and give rise to a single world
producer of a commodity, for example advanced
passenger aircraft, trade policy instruments such as
tariffs or subsidies can be used in the national inter-
est to capture for a second producing nation some of
the world monopoly profits (Airbus vs Boeing).
This argument for government intervention in trade
policy for a new entrant producer is of potential
relevance for developing countries, but in fact it
applies in very few cases. However, the argument
has been inappropriately captured by the United
States to justify their own aggressive bilateral market
opening trade policies, thus undermining the princi-
ples of GATT (see Bhagwati 1991). The willingness
of the US to exert its monopoly power in this way is
one of the deeply divisive issues in the current
Uruguay trade policy negotiations. It would seem
that the rich erect better defences for the mainte-
nance of monopoly power than the poor.
The argument about the distributional outcomes of
accumulation and growth in the world economy
have proceeded so far on the assumption of no
barriers to trade. Amongst the industrial countries,
successive rounds of trade policy liberalization in
the post-war period have practically eliminated trade
barriers for industrial goods. And, through the
impact of the debt crisis and structural adjustment,
far-reaching trade policy liberalisation in develop-
ing countries has been achieved in the 1980s. For the
world economy as a whole, the main areas where
trade policy liberalisation has yet to occur are in
agriculture and services, and in the wide range of
tariff and non-tariff barriers which affect developing
country exports of manufactures to developed coun-
tries. Liberalisation in these areas, plus an important
extension of property rights to intellectual property,
lie at the heart of the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations (see Evans and Joekes 1990).
It is difficult to predict the net beneficiaries of such a
complex set of negotiations, and no attempt will be
made here. However, a successful conclusion to the
Uruguay Round is essential to the idea of a more
liberal new world order. In this context, the willing-
ness of the US to use its monopoly power in bilateral
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trade negotiations combined with strong protection-
ist interests being expressed mainly in both the US
and the EC, threaten the outcome of the negotiations.
The alternative is an accelerating move towards
regionalism; if multilateralism were to break-up, it
would be difficult to predict whether trade creation
within regional blocs will out-weigh trade diver-
sion. It would seem that the very narrow economic
interests being expressed in the US and EC threaten
the entire Uruguay Round package and could lead to
a descent into adverse forms of regionalism. It
would seem better to deal directly with any adverse
distributional consequences which arise from the
Uruguay Round, such as the adverse distributional
consequences of NIC growth in the North, than to
allow narrow economic power to threaten a more
efficient world trading system.
3.9 Status exploitation and gender
A comprehensive analysis of the position of women
in the world economy has only recently been at-
tempted (Joekes 1987). The most favourable distri-
bution impact of world trade on women has been
through their predominant role in low-wage manu-
factured export activity, particularly from the East
Asian NICs, but from other low-wage exporting
areas as well. For women employed in such indus-
tries, the choice of highly exploitative wage employ-
ment over some less palatable alternative, even when
highly exploitative, usually represents a welfare
improvement in Rawlsian terms. As such, the role of
women in the new manufactured exports from de-
veloping countries has greatly contributed to an
over-all reduction of inequality in the world economy.
For the poorest women in South Asia and Africa, the
distributional impacts of changes in the world
economy will depend critically on the interaction
between technical change in agriculture through
new seeds, the liberalisation of world agricultural
markets proposed under the Uruguay round, and
the potential for expanded demand for employment
in the industrial sectors. As producers, women are
likely to benefit from the introduction of new seeds
and the removal of agricultural subsidies in the
developed countries in the Uruguay round. How-
ever, the net counteracting effects on women as
consumers is less predictable. In Latin America,
women's employment suffered with import substi-
tuting industrialization. To the extent that Latin
America is able to give its industry a stronger export
orientation, it is not clear what the impact will be on
women's employment.
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Focus on some of the distributional changes which
have affected women in the world economy does
not, however, go to the heart of status exploitation
through gender. For the latter to be effected, if
would be necessary to start from the differential
effects of gender status on access to and the accumu-
lation of productive assets, and to explore the inter-
action of these effects with the operation of markets,
for example the differential skills and pay to (and
received by) women in the labour market (for a
world economy perspective on the latter, see Stand-
ing (1989)). Only then would it be possible to think
through the possible consequences of a counterfac-
tual world in which status exploitation was re-
moved.
4 POLICY INTERVENTION AND THE
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE
The central thrust of the argument is that the new
world order has inherited a world economy which is
already performing very poorly over-all in terms of
economic equality and in the provision of primary
goods, and is likely to continue to perform poorly in
the future. Today's political leaders may not be
moved by the Rawlsian perspective from which the
distributional judgements were made, but this per-
spective could become more powerful in the context
of a more democratic world order. Whilst demo-
cratic institutions may develop at the national level
only at a slow evolutionary pace, there is striking
need for more democratic accountability in the inter-
national forums which govern world economic policy
and a redirection of economic policies, particularly
in the Bretton Woods institutions and at the G7
meetings of the industrial countries, where votes
reflect economic power rather than democratic rights.
It would seem that the existing levels of poverty in
the world economy and the implied lack of provi-
sion of primary goods undermine the claims for
moral legitimacy of the new order. The overwhelm-
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APPENDIX
Table 1: World Income Distribution
Per Cent World Output Received by Countries in Five Regions
Per Cent of World Output Received by Four Income Tiers
Note: Income comparisons based on purchasing power parities
Source: Summers and Heston (1991, Table IV)








1960 4.3 7.9 24.9 29.7 33.2
1970 4.2 8.8 27.1 29.3 30.6
1980 4.8 11.1 30.2 26.7 27.2
1988 4.0 8.9 35.6 44.4 27.1
1980 Population 12.4 9.2 60.8 11.0 6.6
Percentage
1980 Per capita income, 9.4 29.3 12.0 58.9 100.0
Canada and US=100
Year Lowest Lower Upper Industrialized
Middle Middle
1960 17.2 9.3 5.5 68.0
1970 15.4 11.0 5.6 68.0
1980 15.7 14.2 7.2 62.9
1988 20.6 12.9 6.1 60.4
1980 Population 59.0 15.5 6.0 19.5
Percentage
1980 Per capita income
industrialized
countries= 100
8.2 28.0 37.0 100.0
Table 2A: Incidence of Poverty in Developing Countries
Per Cent of Population Below Poverty Line
Source: Tabatabal (1993, p59). Estimates based on region - specific poverty lines
Table 2B: Prevalence of Underweight Preschool Children, Per Cent
Year Sub-Saharan Near East/ South South China Middle South Total
Africa North Asia East American/ America
Africa Asia Carribean
Source: UN (1992a, plo, Table 1.2)
Table 3: Growth by Region in the World Economy Per Capita GDP Per Cent p a
Note a: The figures for Africa refer to the periods 1960-79 and 1980-1990, but the conclusions in the
text are not substantively influenced by the lack of correspondence with the dates of the other
estimates.
Source: Maddison (1989, p35, Table 35) (World Bank (1981, Statistical Annex, Table 1) and
UNCTAD (1992, p4, Table 1). The estimated population growth for Africa for 1980-1990 was 3%
p.a.
47
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
1975 31.4 19.8 67.7 43.6 26.1 19.3 15.7 41.6
1980 28.9 17.2 63.7 39.1 23.8 17.7 9.3 37.8
1985 29.9 15.1 61.1 34.7 21.3 15.2 8.2 36.1
1990 29.9 13.4 58.5 31.3 21.8 15.4 7.7 34.3
1950-73 1973-87
OECD 3.8 1.9
Developing Asia 2.8 3.6
Latin America 2.5 0.8
Africa 1.6' -1.1'
Year Africa Developing Latin All
Asia America Developing'
1970 46 56 40 52
1985 49 43 36 44
Note a: Excludes China
Table 4A: Indicator of the Stock of Human Capital
A: Average years of formal education experience of population aged 15-64
Source: Maddison (1989, p136, Table C-12)
Table 4B: Gross Enrolment Ratios
Source: Colclough with Lewin (1993, p16, Table 1.2)
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1960 42 85 73 5 21 15 0.7 2.6 3.0
1980 80 97 105 23 38 45 3.5 5.6 13.5
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